Iran’s Second Missile Attack on Israel

October 3, 2024

Publication Type: 

  • Articles and Reports

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile

Related Country: 

  • Israel

Author: 

John Krzyzaniak

On October 1, Iran carried out a second large-scale missile attack against Israel. The strike involved about 180 ballistic missiles in an operation called “True Promise 2.” Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which carried out the operation, said that the attack was in retaliation for Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan. The IRGC also claimed that the retaliation was in “self-defense” and threatened to attack again if Israel responded. Although the full extent of the damage is not yet clear, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that overall the strike was “defeated and ineffective.” There was only one reported fatality resulting from the attack—a Palestinian man who was hit by falling missile debris in the West Bank.

Although the operation differed in meaningful ways from Iran’s first missile attack on Israel in April, the result was largely the same, further underscoring some key limitations for Iran’s conventional missile program and raising the question of whether Iran might become more interested in nuclear weapons as a potentially more reliable deterrent.


Iranian media released footage of the missiles launching.

What munitions did Iran fire?

Iran fired about 180 ballistic missiles of the following types:

  • Fattah-1: Iran’s newest solid-propellant ballistic missile, billed as “hypersonic”
  • Kheybar Shekan: Another of Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missiles, unveiled in 2022
  • Emad: A liquid-propellant ballistic missile derived from the Shahab-3
  • Ghadr: A similar liquid-propellant ballistic missile derived from the Shahab-3

It fired them from several locations, including in the vicinity of Tabriz, Tehran, and Shiraz.

The Iran Watch Table of Iran’s Missile Arsenal contains details on all of Iran’s deployed missiles.


Users on social media shared images of debris from spent boosters. On the left is a liquid-fuel Ghadr or Emad. On the right is a solid-fuel Fattah-1 or Kheybar Shekan.

What were the targets?

According to a statement from the IRGC as well as geolocated images and video, the missiles were aimed at three Israeli airbases—Nevatim, Tel Nof, and Hatzerim—as well as the Mossad headquarters. Nevatim and Hatzerim are in sparsely populated southern Israel, while Tel Nof is about 25 kilometers south of Tel Aviv, Israel’s second largest city. The Mossad headquarters is on the northern side of Tel Aviv.

The Israeli military said that most of the missiles were intercepted, although video footage showed evidence of numerous missiles striking in the vicinity of the aforementioned targets. It was not clear whether these missiles evaded air defenses or whether the defenses simply did not engage missiles that were headed toward unpopulated areas. Israel’s military also acknowledged that several airbases were hit but said that there was no damage to its aircraft or other critical infrastructure that would affect its operations.


Screenshots from a video showing a missile striking Mossad headquaters outside Tel Aviv.

How did this compare to Iran’s April missile attack?

Unlike the attack in April, Iran appears to have only fired ballistic missiles in this latest operation. That is, this time Iran apparently did not fire any unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or cruise missiles, which had made up a substantial portion of the April attack. Counting only the ballistic missiles, however, Iran fired a greater quantity on Tuesday (about 180) than it did in April (about 120).

Iran also seems to have used a greater proportion of its newer and more capable missiles in this latest attack. Iranian state media reported that the IRGC used its newly developed Fattah-1 “hypersonic” missile for the first time as part of the strike. Images and video of launch footage as well as of missile debris also support the conclusion that, overall, Iran used more of its latest solid-fuel missiles—whether Fattah-1 or Kheybar Shekan—than it did of its somewhat older, liquid-fuel Emad and Ghadr systems. Those liquid-fuel missiles figured prominently in the April attack.

Finally, Israel and its partners seem to have had much less advance warning compared to April. In April, Iran reportedly gave 72 hours’ notice ahead of the operation. And once Iran started launching munitions, it began with slow-flying UAVs that took hours to reach Israeli airspace, and only fired the faster ballistic missiles later. By contrast, Iran appears to have given little or no advance warning on Tuesday, and it fired only ballistic missiles. The entire operation was over in less than 45 minutes.

Combined, the higher quantity and quality of Iranian missiles, as well as the lack of advance warning, may help explain why more missiles struck Israeli territory.

Takeaway

Nonetheless, the operation further called into question the value of the missile arsenal as a deterrent, especially against adversaries possessing layered air defenses. Historically, Iran’s leaders have viewed the country’s conventionally-armed missile capability as a key way to deter adversaries and dissuade them from attacking Iran. But in both large-scale attacks on Israel this year, Iranian missiles failed to cause significant damage.

While the failure of the first attack could perhaps be explained away by various factors—e.g., the advance notice and the employment of older missiles—such was not the case in the October strike. In both operations, even where they did get through, the missiles seem to have been too inaccurate, or the warheads too small, to neutralize specific high-value targets.

These shortcomings will no doubt drive Iranian missile development efforts in the future, spurring more interest in systems that can conduct extreme evasive maneuvers, strike with higher precision, and carry heavier warheads. At the same time, Iranian leaders may begin to rethink the deterrent value of their conventionally-armed missiles and become more interested in nuclear weapons—which rely less on accuracy and require only one projectile to penetrate air defenses to have a devastating effect—to fill the deterrence gap.

Major Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks Since 2017

Date

Target

Launch location

Target Location

Munitions fired

Stated Reason

06/18/2017

Islamic State

Kermanshah

Deir Ezzor, Syria

 

Zolfaghar, Qiam (~7 total)

Retaliation for June 2017 terrorist attacks in Tehran

09/08/2018

Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

Khosrowshah
 

Koya, Iraq
 

Fateh-110
(~7 total)

Self-defense; Retaliation for sabotage acts by Kurdish separatist groups

10/1/2018

Islamic State

Kermanshah
 

Hajin, Syria
 

Zolfaghar, Qiam (~6 total)

Retaliation for September 2018 terrorist attack in Ahvaz

9/14/2019

Saudi Aramco facilities

unknown

Abqaiq and Khureis, Saudi Arabia

Delta-Wing UAV (~18 total), Quds LACM (~7 total)

Unknown. Iran denied conducting the attack

1/8/2020

U.S. forces

Kermanshah; Khorramabad?

Ain Al-Asad Airbase; Erbil airport, Iraq

Fateh-313, Qiam (mod.) (~15 total)

Retaliation for January 2020 killing of Qassem Soleimani

3/13/2022

“Mossad agents”

Khosrowshah
 

Erbil, Iraq
 

Fateh-110?
(~12 total)

Retaliation for March 2022 killing of two IRGC generals in Damascus

1/16/2024

“Mossad agents”

Kermanshah; Khosrowshah

Erbil, Iraq
 

Fateh-110? (~ 11 total)

Retaliation for December 2023 killing of IRGC general in Damascus

1/16/2024

Islamic State

Darkhovin, Khuzestan?

Taltita, Syria
 

Kheibar Shekan (~4 total)

Retaliation for January 2024 terrorist attack in Kerman

4/13/2024

Israeli military sites

Multiple, including near Tabriz and Shiraz

Nevatim Airbase

Shahed UAVs (~170 total); Paveh LACMs (~36 total); Emad, Ghadr, Kheibar Shekan (~120 total)

Retaliation for April 2024 Israeli airstrike killing six IRGC officials

10/1/2024 Israeli military sites Multiple, including near Shiraz, Tabriz, and Tehran Hatzerim, Nevatim, and Tel Nof airbases; Mossad HQ Emad, Ghadr, Kheybar Shekan, and Fattah-1 (~180 total) Retaliation for killing of the Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and an IRGC general