Our Publications

International Enforcement Actions
April 28, 2022
From 2017 to 2018, an Iranian procurement network attempted to export sensitive counter-drone technology from the United States to Iran. Iranian national Jalal Rohollahnejad directed the scheme from Iran while working for Rayan Roshd Afzar (Rayan Roshd), an aerospace firm linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He recruited Saber...
Newsletters
April 28, 2022
This month's newsletter features an international enforcement action detailing Iranian efforts to procure counter-drone technologies from the United States. Court documents and business records show that even though the attempted exports were thwarted, the network's ringleader still works with Iranian defense contractors and a China-based company...
Newsletters
March 31, 2022
This month's newsletter features updates to a table tracking Iran’s centrifuges and a report estimating Iran’s ability to make a dash to produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The centrifuge table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of Iran’s currently-deployed centrifuge models as well as the number of each model installed and/...
Articles and Reports
March 31, 2022
Iran has installed several cascades of more powerful centrifuge models in production lines, where they have steadily increased both the size and enrichment level of Iran's uranium stockpile. This progress increases the risk of secret sites – permitting them to be smaller and easier to hide. Iran has used such sites to carry out illicit activity in...
Weapon Program Background Report
March 30, 2022
Iran possesses thousands of gas centrifuges that are the mainstay of its nuclear program. Gas centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to separate uranium isotopes suitable for nuclear fuel, a process known as uranium enrichment.[1] The number and capacity of these machines determine Iran’s "breakout" time: how long it would take Iran—i
Articles and Reports
February 28, 2022
Iran views its external security as reliant on its ability to exert influence in the Middle East. Owing to Tehran’s relative diplomatic and economic isolation, military power is the main tool available to Iran’s leaders for attaining this objective. To be effective, however, Iran must be able to use its military capabilities to credibly threaten...
Newsletters
February 28, 2022
This month's newsletter features a report on Iran’s asymmetric use of its conventional military capabilities. Tehran and its proxies, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have gained regional influence by employing missiles, drones, and small naval vessels in targeted attacks calibrated to avoid large-scale retaliation.
Policy Briefs
January 31, 2022
Almost seven years ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international accord subjecting Iran to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
Newsletters
January 31, 2022
This month's newsletter features a policy brief on the U.N. Security Council's 2231 List. When Security Council resolution 2231 was adopted in 2015, it lifted several sanctions on Iran but also extended restrictions on a list of individuals and entities tied to military aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Yet over the course of seven years the...
Newsletters
December 17, 2021
This month's newsletter features a table containing information about Iran’s centrifuges, as well as an update to a report estimating Iran’s ability to make a dash to produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal.

Pages