Our Publications

Newsletters
January 31, 2023
This month’s newsletter features a policy brief on the consequences of triggering the snapback mechanism of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231. Though it would not halt Iran’s nuclear advances, triggering snapback would allow Europe and the United States to make use of the expanded measures provided for in previous Security Council resolutions...
Policy Briefs
January 31, 2023
Though it would not halt Iran’s nuclear advances, triggering snapback would allow Europe and the United States to make use of the expanded restrictions provided for in previous Security Council resolutions to combat the pressing proliferation challenges posed by Iran.
Articles and Reports
January 12, 2023
This article was first published in The Iran Primer. It is based on an Iran Watch report, Beyond the IR-1: Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges and their Lasting Implications.
Newsletters
December 21, 2022
This month’s newsletter features an article analyzing Iran’s new Ghaem-100 rocket, including details on how it compares to earlier Iranian space-launch vehicles and what its design indicates about the future of Iran’s space and ballistic missile programs.
Articles and Reports
December 19, 2022
Iran now has two programs run by separate institutions that produce large-diameter solid motors which could be used in ballistic missiles. This gives Iran the technological capacity to smash through its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer range limit at virtually any time it chooses.
Articles and Reports
December 18, 2022
Iran has installed several cascades of more powerful centrifuge models in production lines, where they have steadily increased both the size and enrichment level of Iran's uranium stockpile. This progress increases the risk of secret sites – permitting them to be smaller and easier to hide. Iran has used such sites to carry out illicit activity in...
Weapon Program Background Report
November 30, 2022
Iran possesses thousands of gas centrifuges that are the mainstay of its nuclear program. Gas centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to separate uranium isotopes suitable for nuclear fuel, a process known as uranium enrichment.[1] The number and capacity of these machines determine Iran’s "breakout" time: how long it would take Iran—i
Newsletters
November 30, 2022
This month’s newsletter features an article examining Tehran’s growing willingness to supply the Houthi rebels in Yemen with advanced ballistic missiles. It also features an updated report tracking Iran’s deployment of centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
Articles and Reports
November 29, 2022
Both Iran’s armed forces and Yemen’s Houthi rebels staged major military parades in late September. The two parades offered indications that Iran may be increasingly willing to supply the Houthis with its most advanced missiles, and to run greater risks in doing so.
Newsletters
October 27, 2022
This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

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