In December, a federal court in Boston charged two men with conspiring to export U.S.-origin electronics to an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). U.S.-Iranian national Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi was subsequently arrested at his home in Natick, Massachusetts, while his fellow conspirator, Mohammad Abedini, was detained in Milan, Italy, at the request of the United States. Sadeghi and Abedini allegedly procured electronics and technology for Abedini’s Iran-based company San’at Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak Co. (SDRA or SADRA), which manufactures navigation systems for IRGC attack drones.

The case was unusual in that a SDRA-manufactured navigation system had been recovered from the wreckage of a drone used in a January 28, 2024, attack on a U.S. military base in northern Jordan known as Tower 22. The attack killed three U.S. service members and injured 40 others, providing a direct link between the export control evasion facilitated by Sadeghi and Abedini and weapons deployed by U.S. adversaries against U.S. troops. Additionally, the case highlights the difficulty of controlling the export of intangible technology and small electronic components, as well as the importance of due diligence screening in transactions related to sensitive technology.

A Sepehr Navigation System recovered from Tower 22 (left) and a Sepehr Navigation System displayed by SDRA Lab (right). Photo credit: U.S. Department of Justice.

The Players

U.S.-Iranian national Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi (born in 1982) reportedly entered the United States on a student visa in 2007 before receiving a PhD in electrical engineering from the University of Michigan in 2014 and settling in Massachusetts. According to U.S. prosecutors, in 2015, Sadeghi and two other individuals (who were unnamed in the indictment) formed Tacit Motion Inc., a U.S.-based company specializing in wearable fitness monitoring equipment. During the next two years, they sought, and eventually obtained, company funding from the Iranian National Elites Foundation (INEF), a government organization that offers incentives to encourage Iranian professionals in strategic sectors to return to Iran. In exchange, Sadeghi agreed to incorporate a company in Iran and transfer intellectual property and related knowledge from Tacit Motion to the new company. Alongside his role as CEO of Tacit Motion, Sadeghi also obtained a job at U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturer Analog Devices Inc. in 2019.

Iranian national Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi (Abedini) (born in 1986) co-founded Iran-based San’at Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak Co. (SDRA or SADRA) with Kaveh Merat and Hassan Salarieh, the current head of the Iranian Space Agency, in 2011. He later completed a PhD in mechanical engineering at Tehran-based Sharif University of Technology before moving to Switzerland for post-doctoral work at the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL). He soon used his Swiss residency to evade export controls on Iran. According to the indictment, Abedini often shipped U.S.-origin electronic components to Iran through his university address in Switzerland. In September 2019, Abedini co-founded a Swiss company, Illumove SA, with Swiss resident and Iranian national Seyed Mostafa Khosrownejad. According to the U.S. criminal complaint, Abedini intended Illumove to serve as a front for SDRA in order to evade the more stringent sanctions imposed by the United States following the U.S withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

As SDRA CEO/Managing Director, Abedini oversaw the design and manufacture of SDRA’s proprietary Sepehr Navigation System, which has applications in drones and missiles. SDRA began supplying the IRGC Aerospace Force with Sepehr systems in 2014, and these sales constituted the vast majority of SDRA’s business between 2019 and 2023. In all, SDRA sold more than $8 million worth of Sepehr systems to the IRGC in 2021 and 2022. SDRA also had contracts with the IRGC Navy and Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC), which produced some of the drones used in the Tower 22 attack.

The IRGC Aerospace Force oversees the IRGC’s strategic missile, air and space forces and operates Iran’s long-range drone fleet. According to his resume, Abedini not only contracted with the Aerospace Force through SDRA but also worked as a consultant for the Force’s research arm, the Self Sufficiency Jihad Research Organization.

The Pieces

During his graduate studies in Michigan, Sadeghi became an expert on micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) ­­­­­­­­— microscopic devices that use both mechanical and electronic components for functions including measuring an object’s acceleration and orientation. Sadeghi continued his research at Analog Devices while helping to market MEMS to clients in his role as MEMS Technology Group Product Marketing Manager.

MEMS have applications in aircraft navigation, including inertial navigation systems, and other navigation equipment often used in drones. MEMS with these applications are controlled by the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) under ECCN 7A994 and require a license for export directly or indirectly to Iran. U.S. authorities have previously warned that the illicit export of navigational sensors and certain other electronics to Iran are a key driver of Iranian drone production.

Yet from 2016 to 2024, Abedini, often with help from Sadeghi, procured U.S.-origin MEMS and technical data related to MEMS from Analog Devices and other U.S. manufacturers and reexported them from Switzerland to Iran. Because of MEMS’ small size (most are invisible to the naked eye), both Abedini and Sadeghi transported the items in their luggage on passenger flights. Some of these MEMS were components of SDRA’s Sepehr navigation systems – an integral part of Iranian attack drones.

Interactive Network Map

Credit: Wisconsin Project

The Game

Sadeghi and Abedini’s shared engineering expertise facilitated their collaboration, while each leveraged their respective networks to further the export evasion scheme. Sadeghi needed Abedini’s contacts and influence in Iran, including a customer base (the IRGC), a transshipment route (through Switzerland), and the technical aptitude of SDRA. Abedini required a co-conspirator with Sadeghi’s access to Analog Devices and status as a U.S. national. Each conspirator anchored one end of an export evasion network funneling controlled U.S. technology to Iranian drone producers.

The two men’s business relationship began in November 2016, when Sadeghi used his Iranian company to purchase $250,000 worth of firmware and hardware prototypes from Abedini’s company, SDRA. A month later, on behalf of SDRA, Sadeghi ordered electronic components made by Analog Devices and likely smuggled them to Iran during a personal trip in 2017. During his frequent trips to Iran, Sadeghi often accessed his email from a SDRA IP address, indicating he was either physically at a SDRA site or remotely accessing a SDRA server. Abedini purchased an 11 percent stake in Sadeghi’s U.S. company, Tacit Motion, in July 2018 in exchange for certain pieces of intellectual property.

Sadeghi’s biggest contribution to Abedini’s procurement of U.S.-origin goods and technology was his facilitation of a contract between SDRA’s front company, Swiss-based Illumove, and Analog Devices. Sadeghi helped Abedini fabricate an online presence for Illumove that obscured its connection to SDRA after the company’s creation in 2019. In his role as CEO of Tacit Motion Inc., Sadeghi also contributed a letter of intent to the Illumove business plan that Abedini submitted to the Swiss government. Tacit Motion was listed as a “Partner” on Illumove’s website from 2020-2025.

In 2019 and 2020, Sadeghi repeatedly endorsed Illumove to coworkers at Analog Devices, creating and encouraging a relationship that resulted in a formal contract between the two companies in 2021. As part of the arrangement, Analog Devices exported technical data and tens of thousands of dollars of electronic components to Illumove which were subsequently re-exported to Iran. On at least 14 occasions, Analog Devices unknowingly exported unpublished datasheets for electronic components by emailing them to Abedini while he was in Iran. Additionally, SDRA staff masquerading as Illumove employees engaged in remote meetings with Analog Devices technical experts, including from Iran, while using VPNs to obscure their locations.

Ironically, Abedini and the fake Illumove employees were able to leverage the skills and software developed from SDRA’s previous use of smuggled Analog Devices components to gain the confidence of the U.S. company. A project proposal sent by Abedini to Analog Devices in November 2019 claimed that the Illumove team had “worked with almost 50%” of the relevant Analog Devices sensors, even though Illumove had been incorporated only a month before. Both the expertise and the “team” had been provided by SDRA. Abedini also had a head start on the 2021 contract requiring Illumove to develop an evaluation board to test Analog Devices inertial sensors. SDRA had already developed a “NavStudio” or “NavUI” software with some of this functionality prior to 2017 and used images of the software in the project proposal. Some of the images still contained SDRA’s logo.

The Consequence

On January 28, 2024, an Iranian-produced Shahed-101P attack drone struck Tower 22 in northern Jordan, killing three U.S servicemembers. Subsequent analysis of the drone wreckage indicated that the navigation system was manufactured by SDRA and operated on SDRA-produced Sepehr firmware. A collection of Iran-affiliated Iraqi militias known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack, though U.S. Central Command said it bore the “footprints” of one specific member of the group: Kataib Hezbollah.

Sadeghi and Abedini’s illicit exports may have been felt beyond the Middle East, as well.  Sepehr sales skyrocketed by more than 500% after Iran began providing Shahed drones to Russia in 2022, making it likely that SDRA-manufactured components have also guided attack drones to targets in Ukraine.

Sadeghi pleaded not guilty in Boston on December 27, 2024. His case is ongoing. Abedini, however, was abruptly released by Italian authorities on January 12, 2025. The release was reportedly linked to the detention in Iran of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala, who was arrested three days after Abedini and released four days before him. Prior to his release, Abedini, Illumove, SDRA, and its Chief Technology Officer, Kaveh Merat, were placed on the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals List, freezing their assets and placing any entity that does business with them at risk of sanctions.

SDRA logo on software claimed to have been developed by Illumove SA. Photo credit: U.S. Department of Justice.

The Lessons

The Sadeghi-Abedini network provides several important lessons. First, the case is a reminder that export evasion conducted on behalf of U.S. adversaries can have direct battlefield impacts on U.S. and allied forces. The MEMS procured by Abedini and Sadeghi and exported to Iran have many civilian applications, including in wearable monitoring devices (the ostensible product of Tacit Motion Inc.) and autonomous driving and remote sensing (as advertised by Illumove). Yet they also have military applications and ultimately contributed to the drone arsenals of the IRGC, Kataib Hezbollah, and (allegedly) Russia.

Second, electronic component exports are ideal targets for diversion because of their size, relative portability, and classification complexity. Both Abedini and Sadeghi smuggled MEMS to Iran in their suitcases during flights. Abedini also emailed Swiss airport officials prior to one trip in 2016 and obtained approval to carry the U.S.-origin parts in his carry-on. He misrepresented the components as “sample parts” in his email — a claim that went unchallenged.

Intangible technology is even easier to divert. After Illumove signed a contract with Analog Devices in 2021, Abedini was able to export datasheets and technical data sent to Illumove email accounts with the click of a button. As noted above, SDRA employees routinely used VPNs to represent themselves as Switzerland-based Illumove employees and attend meetings with Analog Device representatives. While Abedini had signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement in 2019 confirming that proprietary information shared pursuant to the contract was subject to U.S. export laws, the agreement obviously failed to compel his compliance.

Third, the ease with which microelectronics and intangible technology are transferred across borders substantially increases the risk posed by a rogue employee. Analog Devices seems to have missed a series of red flags in its relationships with Sadeghi, Abedini, and Illumove that should have prompted further due diligence. In particular, Sadeghi’s frequent trips to Iran, including during his employment with Analog Devices, were arguably cause for heightened scrutiny of some of his subsequent actions.

Another red flag was Sadeghi’s repeated advocacy for establishing a business relationship with Illumove and Abedini. A risk assessment of Abedini by Analog Devices’ compliance program should have uncovered his connections to Sharif University and SDRA. A 2019 project proposal from Illumove sent by Abedini to Analog Devices contained screenshots with SDRA’s logo and a reference to SDRA-developed navigation software. Abedini’s four-year stint as a lecturer at Sharif University, which has been sanctioned by the European Union since 2012 for involvement in proliferation-sensitive activities, is listed on his LinkedIn page. Similarly, Illumove’s website and digital infrastructure were created only days before Sadeghi recommended Abedini and the Illumove team to Analog Devices, contradicting Sadeghi’s claim that he had worked “closely” with all three in the past.

Ongoing screening of Sadeghi’s business interests would have also revealed that Abedini had invested in Tacit Motion in 2018, a stake that was eventually transferred to Illumove. That would suggest, at a minimum, that Sadeghi may have had motives for recommending Abedini and Illumove that were distinct from Analog Devices’ own business interests.

If Analog Devices had identified these red flags proactively, the company might have avoided accidentally contracting with an agent of the IRGC to aid an Iranian weapons program.