In this episode of Iran Watch Listen, we sat down with Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson, experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. We discussed the history of Iran and Russia’s military relationship, how it has changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and areas where both countries might benefit from deeper cooperation in the future. The conversation took place on August 21 and was hosted by John Caves, a Senior Research Associate at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, and John Krzyzaniak, a Research Associate at the Wisconsin Project. Read more about our guests below.

Background

When Russia first began using Iranian-made Shahed drones on the battlefield in Ukraine around September 2022, the weapons quickly became a glaring symbol of Iran’s complicity in the war. Although Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian denied arming Russia, international media outlets presented strong evidence to the contrary. In December 2022, White House spokesman John Kirby said that Iran was not only delivering drones but also was considering helping Russia establish a factory to produce them on its own—what came to be known as the Alabuga facility.

While drones may be the most prominent example of Iran-Russia military cooperation in recent years, they are by no means the only one. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, reports indicate that Iran has provided Russia with a wide variety of weapons including artillery rounds, ammunition, glide bombs, and—shortly after the recording of this podcast—ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has launched Iranian satellites, delivered Yak 130 aircraft, and provided Tehran with Western military technology captured on the Ukrainian battlefield, to name a few examples.

Then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited an exhibition of missiles and drones during a trip to Iran in 2023. (Credit: Islamic Republic News Agency)

In short, since 2022, the Iran-Russia military relationship has exhibited a clear upward trajectory, building toward what the White House called a “full-fledged defense partnership” that represents a major departure from the limited, transactional relationship of the past. This partnership is likely to endure even after the war in Ukraine ends.

Our Discussion

Iran-Russia military cooperation is not new, but prior to 2022 the relationship was characterized by a patron-client dynamic in which assistance largely flowed in one direction, with Russia helping Iran. In the 1990s, for example, Iran purchased tanks, submarines, combat aircraft, missiles, and other conventional weapons from Russia. More recently, the two countries cooperated to help prop up the Assad regime in Syria after Russia intervened there in 2015.

Notte and Lamson said that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point that put an end to the patron-client model. According to them, bilateral military cooperation has expanded in both degree and kind since 2022, with Russia and Iran finding new areas to work together and deepening ties in pre-existing areas. Moreover, the factors that constrained cooperation prior to 2022, such as Russia’s sensitivity to Western pressure or Iran’s inability to pay for Russian arms, have diminished in the past few years.

Notte also explained how Russia’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program—and toward global non-proliferation efforts more generally—has evolved since 2022. She said that Russia today is both less willing and less able to facilitate diplomacy between Iran and Western powers or pressure Iran over its lack of cooperation with international inspectors.

Looking ahead, Notte and Lamson said they expect the bilateral relationship to continue advancing along the current trajectory, although they also explain how “black swan” events such as a wider war in the Middle East or regime change in one of the two countries could trigger a shift. They also identified areas where each country might seek assistance from the other in the future. For example, Iran might benefit from Russian technology and expertise on air defense systems or space technologies, while Russia might benefit from the transfer of further drones, missile, and production equipment as well as Iran’s expertise in reverse-engineering Western technology.

Lamson said that the United States and its partners may be somewhat limited in their ability to disrupt Russia-Iran military cooperation, but that there are steps they can and should take. These include strengthening trade controls aimed at preventing key technologies from reaching either country, as well as improving their own air defense capabilities. Notte believes that the United States may be able to lean on Gulf Arab states to use their influence in Moscow to restrain Russia, and that the role of China is an uncertain factor that could either constrain or advance the Iran-Russia defense relationship.

Expert Bios

Dr. Hanna Notte is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and a senior non-resident associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).