Table of Iran's Missile Arsenal

February 22, 2024

Publication Type: 

  • Weapon Program Background Report

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile

Iran's missile arsenal is the largest and most diverse in the Middle East. In 2022, U.S. Central Command's General Kenneth McKenzie stated that Iran possesses “over 3,000” ballistic missiles. This does not include the country’s burgeoning land-attack cruise missile force.[1] Iran has made substantial improvements over the past decade in the precision and accuracy of its missiles, which make them an increasingly potent conventional threat.[2] The focus on precision and accuracy has been accompanied by a self-imposed missile-range limit of 2,000 km, first publicly acknowledged in 2015. Iran could, however, abandon the limit at any time, and indeed has deployed a system, the Khorramshahr, that could almost certainly reach longer ranges if equipped with a lighter warhead. Finally, despite an early reliance on liquid-fueled missiles, Iran has since placed a greater emphasis on developing solid-propellant missiles. This trend will likely continue.[3]

Many Iranian missiles are inherently capable of carrying nuclear payloads, which has long been an international concern. For example, U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 contained language calling upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” for a period of eight years. That exhortation, along with U.N. restrictions on Iranian procurement of missile technology and targeted sanctions on entities involved in missile development, expired in October 2023. But even when the restrictions were in place, Iran persisted in developing a wide array of missiles that are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, as well as space launch vehicles (SLVs) that use many of the same technologies as longer-range ballistic missiles.

Iran has employed missiles in combat on multiple occasions since 2017, including a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces in 2020. Iran has also transferred missiles to proxies such as Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have used them to strike civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and, more recently, to harass commercial ships transiting the Red Sea. It has also allegedly considered selling them to Russia. 

The table below sets forth what is publicly known, claimed, or estimated about the capabilities of Iran's missiles that are most likely to be used either as nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles or for conventional strikes against high-payoff targets, such as bases or infrastructure.[4] Clicking the name of a missile in the table will open an image of that missile in a new tab.

Name

Type[5]

Max Range

Payload

Propulsion

CEP[6]

Status

Shahab-1 (Scud B)

SRBM

up to 300 km

770-1,000 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

~500 m

deployed

Shahab-2 (Scud C)

SRBM

~500 km

~700 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

 700 m

deployed

Qiam-1, Qiam-1 (mod.)[8]

SRBM

700-800 km

650 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

<500 m[7]

deployed

Fateh-110 (including Khalij Fars and Hormuz[9])

SRBM

300 km

~450 kg

solid fuel, single stage

100 m[10]

deployed

Fateh-313

SRBM

500 km

350 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[11] 

deployed

Raad-500 SRBM 500 km unknown solid fuel, single stage 30 m tested

Zolfaghar (including Zolfaghar Basir[12])

SRBM

700 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[13] 

deployed

Dezful

SRBM

1,000 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[14] 

deployed

Shahab-3

MRBM

1,300 km

750-1,000 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

~3 km

deployed

Ghadr

MRBM

1,600 km

~750 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

300 m

deployed

Emad

MRBM

1,800 km

~750 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

<500 m

deployed

Khorramshahr-1, -2, and -4 (BM-25/Musudan) MRBM[15] 2,000-3,000 km 750-1,500 kg liquid fuel, single stage 30 m deployed
Fattah-1[16] MRBM 1,400 km unknown solid fuel, single stage[17] unknown tested
Haj Qassem MRBM 1,400 km 500 kg solid fuel, single stage unknown deployed

Kheibar Shekan

MRBM

1,450 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

unknown

deployed

Sejjil

MRBM

2,000 km

~750 kg

solid fuel, two stage

unknown

deployed

Soumar (Kh-55) LACM unknown[18] unknown turbofan engine N/A possibly deployed
Hoveizeh LACM 1,350 km unknown turbojet engine N/A possibly deployed
Ya Ali LACM 700 km unknown turbojet engine N/A tested
Paveh[19] LACM 1,650 km unknown turbojet engine[20] N/A deployed
Safir SLV 2,100 km[21] 500-750 kg[21] liquid fuel, two stage N/A retired
Simorgh SLV 4,000-6,000 km[21] 500-750 kg[21] liquid fuel, two stage N/A operational
Qased SLV 2,200 km[21] 1,000 kg[21] liquid 1st stage; solid 2nd and 3rd stages N/A operational
Zuljanah SLV 4,000-5,000 km[21] 1,000 kg[21] solid 1st and 2nd stages, liquid 3rd stage N/A tested
Ghaem-100 SLV 3,000-4,000 km[21] 1,000 kg[21] solid fuel, three stage N/A operational

 

Footnotes: 

[1] Independently estimating the size of Iran’s missile arsenal is difficult, given the paucity of reliable information relating to its missile quantities. The U.S. Air Force and some non-governmental organizations have released estimates in the past, but these lack specificity and usually only estimate the number of launchers, not the missiles themselves, since launchers are, in principle, easier to track and count. See “2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, pp. 21, 25, January 2020, available at https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/bm-2020.pdf

[2] Precision is the ability of a weapon to impact where it is aimed; accuracy is the ability of the user to aim the weapon at the true location of the desired target and of the weapon to be precise enough to hit it. Accuracy thus takes into account target acquisition and tracking capabilities. For example, Iran’s development of capable surveillance drones has served to improve the accuracy of its missile forces.

[3] Missiles can be classified according to whether they are liquid-fueled or solid-fueled. A liquid-fueled missile engine generally can produce more thrust per pound of fuel than a solid-rocket motor but is more complex and can require many precision-machined and moving parts. Some types of liquid-fueled missiles must also be fueled at their launch site, which makes them easier for an opponent to detect and destroy. Solid rocket motors are relatively economical and easier to maintain and store. Solid fuel also allows for a more rapid launch. Solid-fueled missiles are therefore generally less vulnerable in combat. Iranian engineers do not appear to have the wherewithal to design and build a liquid-fueled engine from scratch, but they do possess that ability for solid-fueled motors. The ability to build new systems tailored to Iran’s military needs, in addition to the operational advantages, helps explain Iran’s increasing preference for solid-fuel missiles.

[4] The table does not include missiles or artillery rockets with a maximum range below 300 km, missiles that have only been displayed as mock-ups, surface-to-air missiles, or anti-ship cruise missiles. Nor does it include derivatives, variants, or renamed copies of Iranian missiles that have been used by Iran’s regional proxies, such as the Houthis. The capabilities of those missiles can be best assessed by referencing the Iranian missiles they are modeled after. For example, the Houthis’ Burkan-2H ballistic missile closely resembles the Iranian Qiam-1. Similarly, Iran’s Rezvan appears to be a copy of the Houthi Zulfiqar, itself a modified Qiam.

[5] Ballistic missiles can be divided into five classes based on range: close-range (less than 300 km), short-range (300 to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), intermediate-range (3,000 to 5,500 km), and intercontinental (more than 5,500 km). Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is composed mainly of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), although some work on longer-range missiles is suspected. Space launch vehicles (SLVs) are designed to launch satellites into orbit but could potentially be reconfigured as ballistic missiles due to their similar characteristics. Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) function essentially as pilotless aircraft and do not fly on a ballistic trajectory, thus posing a challenge to missile defense systems.

[6] Missile precision is commonly measured by circular error probable (CEP): the radius within which, on average, half of all missiles fired will land. For example, given a missile with a CEP of ten meters, if one hundred were launched at a target, on average fifty would land within ten meters of the target.

[7] Although the original Qiam probably had a CEP of several hundred meters, a modified version with a steerable re-entry vehicle has likely improved upon that. Evidence suggests that it was this newer version that was among the missiles used in the January 2020 strike on U.S. forces in Iraq.

[8] The modified Qiam-1 has been called Qiam-2 by some independent analysts, but not by official Iranian sources.

[9] The Khalij Fars is the anti-ship variant of the Fateh-110, while the Hormuz is the anti-radar variant.

[10] Iran has reportedly developed a guidance kit for the Fateh-110 that, when attached, can reduce its CEP to 30 meters or less.

[11] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack.

[12] The Zolfaghar Basir is the anti-ship variant of the Zolfaghar.

[13] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack. Also based on similar assessments following the Great Prophet 17 military exercise in December 2021.

[14] Based on its use in the Great Prophet 17 military exercise suggesting it has precision similar to that of the Zolfaghar.

[15] Iran has displayed at least four different variants of the Khorramshahr missile, each potentially with its own specifications in terms of range, warhead size, and accuracy. Iran has consistently claimed that the missile has a 2,000 km maximum range and a warhead with a mass of 1,500 kg or greater. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom claimed in 2019, however, that one variant of the missile has a nose cone whose size would limit the warhead mass to about 750 kg. They further claimed that the modelling of such a missile puts its range at approximately 3,000 km, which would classify it as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). See, “Letter dated 25 March 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," United Nations Security Council, S/2019/270, March 27, 2019, available at https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/270.  

[16] Iran has billed the Fattah-1 as a “hypersonic” missile. Hypersonic missiles are typically defined not only by their ability to reach speeds in excess of Mach 5, but also by their ability to maintain such speeds while making significant maneuvers within the atmosphere during flight. Although the Fattah missile may fit this description, it is largely in a class of its own in terms of how it achieves this: the two main types of hypersonic missiles under development across the world are hypersonic gliders and hypersonic cruise missiles, and the Fattah, a ballistic missile with an extra solid rocket motor in its re-entry vehicle, is neither.

[17] The Fattah-1 missile consists of a large solid rocket booster (derived from the Kheibar Shekan design) plus a small solid rocket motor situated inside the re-entry vehicle for terminal maneuvering. The latter is a post-boost propulsion system, and these are not traditionally counted as “stages.” The Minuteman III, for example, is considered a three-stage missile even though it consists of three solid rocket motors plus a liquid-fueled post-boost vehicle. So, Fattah can be considered a single-stage missile.

[18] In 2001, Iran illicitly acquired six Soviet-made Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 2,500 km. In 2012, an Iranian official claimed that Iran’s forthcoming copy of the Kh-55, modified to have a solid-rocket booster for ground launch, would have a range exceeding 2,000 km. In 2019, however, an official claimed the missile’s range was only 700 km. There is not sufficient open-source evidence to verify either of the claims, but it is unlikely that Iran has successfully reverse-engineered a turbofan engine with the capabilities to match those of the original Soviet type.

[19] Paveh is the Iranian name for the missile that Yemen's Houthi rebels have displayed as the Quds. By all appearances, the two missile types are identical. The Quds, also referred to as the "351" missile in various sources, was used in the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, long before Iran acknowledged having the missile in its own arsenal. Although the Houthis claimed responsibility for that attack, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen presented evidence in a 2020 report that the missile’s components were made in Iran and that the attack could not have been launched from Houthi-controlled territory. The Houthis have displayed  several variants of the Quds.

[20] Based on visual similarities with the Quds-1. 

[21] Estimate if reconfigured as a ballistic missile.