[1] Independently estimating the size of Iran’s missile arsenal is difficult, given the paucity of reliable information relating to its missile quantities. The U.S. Air Force and some non-governmental organizations have released estimates in the past, but these lack specificity and usually only estimate the number of launchers, not the missiles themselves, since launchers are, in principle, easier to track and count. See “2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, pp. 21, 25, January 2020, available at https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/bm-2020.pdf. 

[2] Precision is the ability of a weapon to impact where it is aimed; accuracy is the ability of the user to aim the weapon at the true location of the desired target and of the weapon to be precise enough to hit it. Accuracy thus takes into account target acquisition and tracking capabilities. For example, Iran’s development of capable surveillance drones has served to improve the accuracy of its missile forces.

[3] Missiles can be classified according to whether they are liquid-fueled or solid-fueled. A liquid-fueled missile engine generally can produce more thrust per pound of fuel than a solid-rocket motor but is more complex and can require many precision-machined and moving parts. Some types of liquid-fueled missiles must also be fueled at their launch site, which makes them easier for an opponent to detect and destroy. Solid rocket motors are relatively economical and easier to maintain and store. Solid fuel also allows for a more rapid launch. Solid-fueled missiles are therefore generally less vulnerable in combat. Iranian engineers do not appear to have the wherewithal to design and build a liquid-fueled engine from scratch, but they do possess that ability for solid-fueled motors. The ability to build new systems tailored to Iran’s military needs, in addition to the operational advantages, helps explain Iran’s increasing preference for solid-fuel missiles.

[4] The table does not include close-range ballistic missiles or artillery rockets with a maximum range below 300 km, missiles that have only been displayed as mock-ups, surface-to-air missiles, or anti-ship cruise missiles. Nor does it include derivatives, variants, or renamed copies of Iranian missiles that have been used by Iran’s regional proxies, such as the Houthis. The capabilities of those missiles can be best assessed by referencing the Iranian missiles they are modeled after. For example, the Houthis’ Burkan-2H ballistic missile closely resembles the Iranian Qiam-1. Similarly, Iran’s Rezvan appears to be a copy of the Houthi Zulfiqar, itself a modified Qiam.

[5] Ballistic missiles can be divided into five classes based on range: close-range (less than 300 km), short-range (300 to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), intermediate-range (3,000 to 5,500 km), and intercontinental (more than 5,500 km). Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is composed mainly of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), although some work on longer-range missiles is suspected. Space launch vehicles (SLVs) are designed to launch satellites into orbit but could potentially be reconfigured as ballistic missiles due to their similar characteristics. Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) function essentially as pilotless aircraft and do not fly on a ballistic trajectory, thus posing a challenge to missile defense systems.

[6] Missile precision is commonly measured by circular error probable (CEP): the radius within which, on average, half of all missiles fired will land. For example, given a missile with a CEP of ten meters, if one hundred were launched at a target, on average fifty would land within ten meters of the target.

[7] The modified Qiam-1 has been called Qiam-2 by some independent analysts, but not by official Iranian sources.

[8] Although the original Qiam probably had a CEP of several hundred meters, a modified version with a steerable re-entry vehicle has likely improved upon that. Evidence suggests that it was this newer version that was among the missiles used in the January 2020 strike on U.S. forces in Iraq.

[9] The Khalij Fars is the anti-ship variant of the Fateh-110, while the Hormuz is the anti-radar variant.

[10] Iran has reportedly developed a guidance kit for the Fateh-110 that, when attached, can reduce its CEP to 30 meters or less.

[11] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack.

[12] The Zolfaghar Basir is the anti-ship variant of the Zolfaghar.

[13] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack. Also based on similar assessments following the Great Prophet 17 military exercise in December 2021.

[14] Based on its use in the Great Prophet 17 military exercise suggesting it has precision similar to that of the Zolfaghar.

[15] Iran has displayed at least three different variants of the Khorramshahr missile (Khorramshahr-1, -2, and -4), each potentially with its own specifications in terms of range, warhead size, and accuracy. Iran has consistently claimed that the missile has a 2,000 km maximum range and a warhead with a mass of 1,500 kg or greater. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom claimed in 2019, however, that one variant of the missile has a nose cone whose size would limit the warhead mass to about 750 kg. They further claimed that the modelling of such a missile puts its range at approximately 3,000 km, which would classify it as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). See, “Letter dated 25 March 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," United Nations Security Council, S/2019/270, March 27, 2019, available at https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/270.

[16] The Khorramshahr-4 is equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) powered by small rocket thrusters. See, Fabian Hinz, “Removing the hype from Iran’s ‘hypersonic’ conqueror,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 14, 2023, available at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/07/removing-t....

[17] Iran has billed the Fattah-1 as a “hypersonic” missile. Hypersonic missiles are typically defined not only by their ability to reach speeds in excess of Mach 5, but also by their ability to maintain such speeds while making significant maneuvers within the atmosphere during flight. Although the Fattah missile may fit this description, it is largely in a class of its own in terms of how it achieves this: the two main types of hypersonic missiles under development across the world are hypersonic gliders and hypersonic cruise missiles, and the Fattah, a ballistic missile with an extra solid rocket motor in its re-entry vehicle, is neither.

[18] The Fattah-1 missile consists of a large solid rocket booster (derived from the Kheibar Shekan design) plus a small solid rocket motor situated inside the re-entry vehicle for terminal maneuvering (a maneuverable reentry vehicle, or MaRV). The latter is a post-boost propulsion system, and these are not traditionally counted as “stages.” The Minuteman III, for example, is considered a three-stage missile even though it consists of three solid rocket motors plus a liquid-fueled post-boost vehicle. So, Fattah can be considered a single-stage missile.

[19] A cutaway model of the Fattah-2’s reentry vehicle was shown to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2023, along with a ballistic missile motor resembling that used in the Fattah-1. Iran is not known to have launched the Fattah-2. Because the Fattah-2 uses the proven Fattah-1 rocket motor, however, we are not considering it to be solely a mock-up (see footnote 4 above). See: Jeremy Binnie, “Iran unveils Fattah-2 hypersonic cruise missile,” Jane’s, November 21, 2023, available at https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/iran-unveils-f....

[20] The Qassem Basir is reportedly an upgraded Haj Qassem missile equipped with electro-optical (EO) seekers to provide terminal guidance and help the missile evade defenses. EO seekers are normally used on anti-ship ballistic missiles in order to enable the missile to strike a moving target. If the Qassem Basir has in fact been successfully equipped with EO seekers adapted for use on a surface-to-surface missile, it would likely be more precise than the Haj Qassem. 

[21] In 2001, Iran illicitly acquired six Soviet-made Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 2,500 km. In 2012, an Iranian official claimed that Iran’s forthcoming copy of the Kh-55, modified to have a solid-rocket booster for ground launch, would have a range exceeding 2,000 km. In 2019, however, an official claimed the missile’s range was only 700 km. There is not sufficient open-source evidence to verify either of the claims, but it is unlikely that Iran has successfully reverse-engineered a turbofan engine with the capabilities to match those of the original Soviet type.

[22] Paveh is the Iranian name for the missile that Yemen's Houthi rebels have displayed as the Quds. By all appearances, the two missile types are identical. The Quds, also referred to as the "351" missile in various sources, was used in the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, long before Iran acknowledged having the missile in its own arsenal. Although the Houthis claimed responsibility for that attack, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen presented evidence in a 2020 report that the missile’s components were made in Iran and that the attack could not have been launched from Houthi-controlled territory. The Houthis have displayed several variants of the Quds.

[23] Based on visual similarities with the Quds-1.

[24] Estimate if reconfigured as a ballistic missile.