This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen that discusses emerging realities after the bombing of Iran’s nuclear program and the return of United Nations sanctions against Iran, as well as news and other resources related to the “snapback” of U.N. sanctions.

This month’s newsletter features a report analyzing how quickly Iran might enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of U.S. and Israeli air strikes in June.

This month’s newsletter features a report on the status of Iran’s nuclear facilities, which were targeted in airstrikes last month. The international community has long raised concerns about the dual-use potential of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, which could be used to make fuel for reactors or weapons. Israel and the United States acted on those concerns, carrying out airstrikes that caused damage to Iran’s uranium enrichment and processing sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. However, the full extent of the damage remains unclear, absent on-site inspections.

This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss the opportunities and pitfalls facing the Trump administration as it makes a last-ditch effort to prevent Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program from crossing the threshold to a bomb.

This month’s newsletter features a case study of a U.S. export enforcement action against a network that procured U.S.-origin electronics for drones used to kill three U.S. service members in the 2024 “Tower-22” attack in Jordan. The study illustrates how two men duped an American company into exporting electronics and technical data through Switzerland to Iran, with lethal consequences.

This month’s newsletter features updates to a report estimating how quickly Iran could enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal and a table accounting for Iran’s deployed centrifuges. Based on data from the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium is sufficient to fuel five nuclear weapons if enriched further to weapons-grade. Iran’s installed centrifuges could achieve the required enrichment in about a week.

This month’s newsletter features a report with recommendations for how an aggressively-implemented export control policy can support the new administration’s objectives on Iran. Tehran and its proxies were weakened in 2024, and there is now an opportunity to hinder their rearmament by targeting Iran’s production of drones and missiles. Doing so would strengthen the United States’ hand in possible diplomacy aimed at denying Iran a nuclear weapon. 

This month’s newsletter features an update to a running timeline of Iran’s missile milestones. Since the last update, Iran carried out two missile attacks against Israel, the European Union established new sanctions on Iran’s missile program, Iran transferred ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine, and the Houthis unveiled new missiles indicating further transfers of technology from Iran. 

This month’s newsletter features an update to a report estimating how quickly Iran could enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal. The update reflects data from the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, which indicate that Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium is sufficient to fuel five nuclear weapons if enriched further to weapons-grade. Iran’s installed centrifuges could achieve the required enrichment in less than a week.