This month's newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with Dr. Bruce Goodwin to discuss the process of building nuclear weapons from a technical perspective, and explored the experience Iran has with some of the key steps of the weaponization process.

This month’s newsletter features updates to a timeline of milestones in Iran’s nuclear program. Since the last update in May 2022, efforts to restore the 2015 nuclear deal have come to a halt and Iran has begun, continued, or completed the construction of several new nuclear-related facilities. Additionally, the newsletter features remarks by Wisconsin Project Executive Director Valerie Lincy at a recent event on Iran's drone program hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

This month's newsletter features updates to several Iran Watch resources tracking Iran's missile and nuclear programs. Over the last year, Iran has unveiled new ballistic and cruise missile models and launched the Ghaem-100 space launch vehicle. On the nuclear side, Iran's break-out timeline for a small nuclear arsenal continues to shrink as the country expands its stockpile of enriched uranium and brings more advanced centrifuges into operation.

This month’s newsletter features the findings from an Iran Watch roundtable on Iranian drones. An expert panel convened by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control identified areas where the United States and its partners could do more to slow Iran’s drone development and halt the flow of capable Iranian drones to Russia.

This month’s newsletter features a policy brief on the consequences of triggering the snapback mechanism of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231. Though it would not halt Iran’s nuclear advances, triggering snapback would allow Europe and the United States to make use of the expanded measures provided for in previous Security Council resolutions to combat the pressing proliferation challenges posed by Iran. The newsletter also includes profiles of companies sanctioned by the U.S. Commerce Department in 2021 for supplying Iran with U.S.-origin items useful to Iran's military industries, as well as news about a drone attack on an Iranian defense facility, Iran’s growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium, a year-end uptick in Iranian oil exports, and a European Parliament vote supporting the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group. Additions to the Iran Watch library include Western sanctions announcements related to drones and human rights as well as several recent U.S. law enforcement actions.

This month’s newsletter features an article analyzing Iran’s new Ghaem-100 rocket, including details on how it compares to earlier Iranian space-launch vehicles and what its design indicates about the future of Iran’s space and ballistic missile programs.

This month’s newsletter features an article examining Tehran’s growing willingness to supply the Houthi rebels in Yemen with advanced ballistic missiles. It also features an updated report tracking Iran’s deployment of centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with Dan Gettinger and Adam Rawnsley to discuss Iran’s military drone program, including the country’s current capabilities, its drone exports to governments and non-state groups, and whether tighter sanctions and export controls could hinder the program’s progress.

This month’s newsletter features an update to a table of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the addition of several undeclared sites where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered uranium particles. The newsletter also features an updated report tracking Iran’s advanced centrifuges, which reflects Iran’s recent deployment of several cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at its Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment plants.

This month’s newsletter features an analysis of the British Royal Navy’s seizure earlier this year of a weapons shipment headed for Yemen. Evidence suggests that the seized missile components came from Iran, but a deeper investigation also points to companies based in several other countries—as well as weaknesses in national export control systems—that enabled Iran to acquire the parts in the first place.