This month’s newsletter features updates to a table tracking the capabilities of Iran’s missile arsenal and to a report estimating how quickly Iran could enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal. The missile table includes new details gleaned from a December 2021 military exercise. The nuclear timetable update revises downward the estimated time it would take Iran to enrich enough uranium for five warheads, reflecting data published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in May.

This month’s newsletter features an update to a timeline tracking milestones in Iran’s missile program as well as an update to the table detailing Iran’s centrifuge models and status. New entries to the missile timeline include the unveiling of a new solid-fueled ballistic missile as well as a March 2022 ballistic missile attack against a compound outside of Erbil, Iraq. The centrifuge table reflects data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This month's newsletter features an update to a timeline tracking Iran’s nuclear progress. New entries cover the appointment of a U.N.-sanctioned individual as head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), a monitoring dispute between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over a centrifuge plant, and Iran’s use of advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as proposals to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

This month's newsletter features an international enforcement action detailing Iranian efforts to procure counter-drone technologies from the United States. Court documents and business records show that even though the attempted exports were thwarted, the network's ringleader still works with Iranian defense contractors and a China-based company today.

This month's newsletter features updates to a table tracking Iran’s centrifuges and a report estimating Iran’s ability to make a dash to produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The centrifuge table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of Iran’s currently-deployed centrifuge models as well as the number of each model installed and/or enriching uranium. Both updates are based on the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports released earlier this month.

This month's newsletter features a report on Iran’s asymmetric use of its conventional military capabilities. Tehran and its proxies, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have gained regional influence by employing missiles, drones, and small naval vessels in targeted attacks calibrated to avoid large-scale retaliation. The report includes a description of Iran's most potent conventional capabilities as well as analysis of Tehran’s strategic thinking.

This month's newsletter features a policy brief on the U.N. Security Council's 2231 List. When Security Council resolution 2231 was adopted in 2015, it lifted several sanctions on Iran but also extended restrictions on a list of individuals and entities tied to military aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Yet over the course of seven years the 2231 List has fallen out of date. Our brief highlights where the 2231 List has become outdated and the risks associated with a failure to keep it current.

This month's newsletter features a table containing information about Iran’s centrifuges, as well as an update to a report estimating Iran’s ability to make a dash to produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The centrifuge table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of Iran’s currently-deployed centrifuge models as well as the number of each model installed and/or producing enriched uranium, based on the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports.

This month's newsletter features two publications on the status and implications of Iran’s advanced centrifuges. From the IR-1 to the possible fifth-generation IR-9, Iran is committed to operating centrifuge models that can enrich greater amounts of uranium with fewer machines. Iran’s increasing mastery of centrifuge design and manufacturing raises the risk of a "sneakout," in which Iran could use secret sites to produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

This month's newsletter features an international enforcement action examining two recent prosecutions of Iranian efforts to illicitly procure mass spectrometers, machines that can be used for uranium enrichment as well as a range of non-nuclear activities. The two cases, one in Germany and the other in the United States, showcase the diverse methods Iran uses to acquire export controlled technology.