Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)

Also Known As: 

Shahid Baheri Industries Group
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group
Department 140/14
Shahid Bagheri Industries Group
Mahtab Technical Engineering Company
Composite Propellant Missile Industry
Sanaye Sokhte Morakab

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile


Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran


(+98-21) 66250492


+98 021 6250007


A subordinate of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); responsible for the development and production of Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

Produces the 200 kilometer range Fateh-110 missile and the 40-100 kilometer range Fajr rocket system (a North Korean-designed rocket produced under license); reportedly developed the Sejjil-2 solid-propellant two-stage ballistic missile under the supervision of Sanam Industrial Group (Department 140), which is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO).

Reportedly bought specialty metals and chemicals used in missile production from China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO); according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, between 2004 and 2006 procured goods controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime from China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC); in 2007, was reportedly the intended recipient of an intercepted Chinese shipment (through Singapore) of large quantities of a chemical compound used to make solid fuel for ballistic missiles; reportedly was the end user of ballistic missile jet vanes shipped from North Korea to Iran, via Beijing, by Air Koryo and Iran Air between January and August 2007.

Reportedly bought five tons of carbon fiber with missile applications from China-based Korean Yoon Network Shanghai Company in December 2009; between 2007-2008, reportedly procured graphite cylinders, pressure bolts, gyroscopes, and accelerometers with missile applications from Chinese manufacturer LIMMT, operating under the name Dalian Sunny Industries; reportedly sought to purchase a Model 3 GFF-700 cold flow milling machine, which has missile applications; reportedly attempted to procure environmental test chambers from a German firm by using Iranian procurement firm Rakin and routing the shipment through the United Arab Emirates in 2008.

Organization logo was found stamped on missile debris recovered from the November 2017 missile strike on Saudi Arabia by Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthis; reportedly shipped CNC (computer numerical control) machines, computers for controlling missiles, and materials for the development of rockets, including for engine production, to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) via Venezuela's Conviasa airline.

Subordinate entities include:

Front companies include:

Arshia Trading Company is an affiliate; has conducted research with Malek Ashtar University of Technology.

Reportedly received help with procurement from MKS International Co. Ltd.Ali Karimian, and Li Fang Wei.

Entities reported to have provided financial services include Bank Sepah and Bank Melli; has received insurance services from the Payam Besharat Insurance Services Company, a subsidiary of Iran Insurance Company.

Reportedly has a guidance and control department, as well as a communications department.

Company officials reportedly have included Omran Torabi (sales and marketing director), Saeed Esfahani (commercial director), Mohammad Hassan Ahmad Abadi (CEO), Mohammad Sadegh Nazari, Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi, and Rahim Ahmadi (manager).

Established in 1986.


Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 23, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Designated by the U.S. Department of State on June 28, 2005, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; added on June 29, 2005, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Added on July 12, 2007, to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List of end users subject to heightened export license requirements (with a presumption of denial) due to involvement in proliferation activities or other activities of national security concern.

Sanctioned (with all successors, sub-units, and subsidiaries) by the U.S. Department of State on May 23, 2011, under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA); sanctions apply for two years and ban the U.S. government from procuring from, contracting with, providing assistance to, or issuing export licenses involving controlled items for the entity; previous INKSNA designations: July 14, 2010.

Sanctioned for a period of two years by the United States on February 2, 2009, and February 11, 2013, pursuant to Executive Order 12938, for engaging in proliferation activities; sanctions prohibit U.S. government procurement from or assistance to the entity, import into the United States of products provided by the entity, and transfers of U.S.-origin defense goods and services destined for the entity.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 

Date Entered: 

January 26, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

December 20, 2023