A subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) that has sought glass fibers, vacuum chamber furnaces, and laboratory equipment for Iran's nuclear program.

Attempted to procure four rotary vacuum pumps, components, and accessories for use with vacuum pumps for the Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and Medicine (Karaj), but the procurement was denied on April 11, 2003, by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); intended recipient of vacuum pumps and components, the procurement of which was denied on January 28, 2002, by an NSG member state; intended recipient of an inductively coupled plasma time-of-flight mass spectrometer, the procurement of which was denied in April 2001, by an NSG member state.

Develops and provides advanced non-destructive testing inspection equipment; manufactures and supplies radioimmunoassay kits, radiopharmaceuticals, and laboratory equipment; has expertise in examining metal structures in aircraft, ships, drilling rigs, bridges, power stations, petrochemical plants, and oil and gas pipelines; previous projects include work at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

Sole shareholder is the AEOI; J. Torabinejad is reportedly a contact person.

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on March 24, 2007, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in or supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.

Previously removed from the U.N. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); returned to the U.N. list on September 28, 2025, as part of the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

Listed by the European Union on April 21, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Previously removed from the E.U. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the E.U. list on September 29, 2025, as part of the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran.

Added on February 16, 2007, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems; removed from the SDN list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, and has had export licenses both granted and denied by that government, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.