In this episode of Iran Watch Listen, we sat down with Behnam Ben Taleblu and Michael Eisenstadt, experts on the strategic challenges posed by Iran. We discussed the opportunities and pitfalls facing the second Trump administration as it makes a last-ditch effort to prevent Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program from crossing the threshold to a bomb. The conversation took place on April 22 and was hosted by Valerie Lincy, Executive Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, and John Caves, a Senior Research Associate at the Wisconsin Project. Read more about our guests below.

Background

Early 2025 brought an unusual consensus in Washington, DC, that there was an opportunity for a breakthrough in U.S. Iran policy. Part of that expectation was due to the change in administration: President Donald Trump took office seemingly more willing to threaten and use military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, as well as more inclined to vigorously enforce U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector. But the Trump administration has also been willing to negotiate with Tehran as an alternative to military force, with the United States and Iran having engaged in a series of talks since mid-April.

The second factor was events in the Middle East in 2024. Israel and Iran twice exchanged fire directly, with large-scale Iranian attacks in April and October having only limited effects and the Israeli response leaving Iran’s missile production capacity stalled and its nuclear sites exposed to further attack. Israel also badly degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon, effectively neutralizing Iran’s most capable proxy, while the Iran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria collapsed in December. Iran thus entered 2025 vulnerable, while Israel was emboldened and seemingly willing to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if given a green light from Washington.

A fighter aircraft takes off from the USS Harry S. Truman in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. (Photo Credit: U.S. Department of Defense)

Yet Iran’s nuclear program in 2025 is more advanced that it has ever been, with Tehran possessing multiple bombs’ worth of highly-enriched uranium and the capacity to quickly process it to weapon grade. Iran’s newfound vulnerability to conventional attack, paradoxically, may make it both more amenable to a deal and also more tempted to quickly develop a nuclear weapon. The questions of how to exploit the possible window of opportunity and what to aim for in doing so have therefore become paramount, as there is a widespread impression that there may be only one shot.

Our Discussion

We attempted to answer some key questions about what any new U.S. policy should attempt to achieve, drawing from reports recently authored by Ben Taleblu and Eisenstadt. Should the United States insist on Iran’s disarmament and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program, or accept a more modest outcome in an effort to buy time and mitigate the near-term risk of a nuclear breakout? How might military action or the threat of it shape the policy environment? What should the focus of sanctions be? Are U.S. counterproliferation goals in tension with efforts to increase the likelihood of regime change in Tehran?

Ben Taleblu argued that current circumstances offer an opportunity to seek Iranian disarmament that is not limited narrowly to the nuclear issue, but addresses Iran’s missile arsenal and proxy threats as well. Eisenstadt said that the administration might permit Iran to retain a symbolic enrichment capability, so it was necessary to analyze the potential trade-offs that might entail. He also said that if a new deal proves unachievable, preventative action could reduce the scope of Iran’s nuclear program and set into motion events which enable outcomes that might not be attainable now. Any preventative action would likely require sustained follow-up, which makes it important that the United States shape the diplomatic environment by coordinating with allies and partners.

Neither Ben Taleblu nor Eisenstadt discounted the possibility of an escalatory response from Iran to military strikes or sanctions, but both questioned the assumption that a U.S. or Israeli strike would necessarily trigger an “all-out” regional war. Ben Taleblu also questioned whether a military strike would result in a “rally around the flag effect” that lessens domestic dissent inside Iran, though both agreed that the nature of a strike and the amount of collateral damage caused by it would have an effect on how it is perceived by the Iranian population.

Ben Taleblu said that U.S. counter-proliferation goals should be nested within counter-regime goals. In his view, a limited nuclear deal or even a limited strike on nuclear facilities could have the unintended consequence of “locking in” the current Iranian regime, which would hinder U.S. efforts to resolve broader foreign policy challenges in the Middle East and permit a long-desired pivot to Asia. According to Eisenstadt, although a post-Islamic Republic government may want to maintain a nuclear program, engaging it and making diplomatic and economic support contingent on its acceptance of safeguards to ensure that the program remains peaceful might help the new government consolidate power and reintegrate into the international community.

Both agreed that sanctions are an important tool not only for pressuring Iran to negotiate, but also for the post-negotiation phase of policy: either to keep Iran in a deal through sanctions relief or to constrain its financial resources should a deal collapse. Eisenstadt cautioned of a need to find a “sweet spot” where sanctions put significant pressure on Iran’s finances but do not prompt Tehran to lash out militarily like it did in 2019. Ben Taleblu argued that Iran’s vulnerable security situation, rather than economic pressure, was what primarily drove Iran to seek negotiations this year.

Eisenstadt warned that the United States could find itself in an “October 6th” moment where its adversaries take advantage of U.S. distraction with domestic divisions, like Hamas did to Israel in 2023. Ben Taleblu argued that the United States should “push back from the table” to press Iran broadly rather than settle for a limited deal. Both emphasized the need for planning and preparation to ensure the United States makes the best use of its current window of opportunity, given Iran’s nearness to crossing the nuclear weapon threshold and increased motivation to do so as its conventional deterrent has shrunk.

Expert Bios

Behnam Ben Taleblu is senior director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ (FDD’s) Iran Program, where he oversees FDD’s work on Iran in addition to serving as a senior fellow specializing in Iranian security and political issues, including nuclear non-proliferation, ballistic missiles and drones, sanctions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies, and Iranian politics.

Michael Eisenstadt is the Kahn Senior Fellow and director of The Washington Institute of Near East Studies' Military and Security Studies Program, with a focus on Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli security affairs, irregular and conventional warfare, and nuclear proliferation. He previously worked as a military analyst with the U.S. government and served as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Related Resources

• Michael Eisenstadt, “Attacking Iran's Nuclear Program: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Action,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 11, 2025.
• Orde Kittrie, Andrea Stricker, and Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament: The Only Deal That Protects U.S. and Allied Security,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 2025.

Credits

Intro/Outro music by AudioCoffee (Denys Kyshchuk).

Subscribe to Iran Watch Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.