A Chinese businessman; according to the U.S. Department of Justice, conspired to illegally purchase and export dual-use microelectronics from the United States to Iran for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (ASF SSJO) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.
Featured Suppliers
This page contains profiles of Iran's suppliers researched and written by the Wisconsin Project. These entities -- persons, companies, governments -- are thought to have supplied technology, equipment, material, or expertise to Iran that would enhance Iran's ability to construct nuclear, chemical, biological or advanced conventional weapons or long-range missiles. Many of the entities have been explicitly identified by governments as contributing to these programs.
The suppliers on this page are those the Wisconsin Project has chosen to feature. For a full list of suppliers on Iran Watch, see the "Alphabetical List of Suppliers."
The Wisconsin Project believes this information to be reliable; however, the Wisconsin Project does not guarantee full accuracy or completeness. The Wisconsin Project invites comment on this information that could aid in presenting a full and accurate picture of the entity described.
Military, Drone
A front company for the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); part of a network that has facilitated and financed the sale of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia on behalf of MODAFL.
Military, Drone
A China-based import-export company; part of a network that has facilitated shipments and financial transactions in support of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries's production, procurement, and maintenance of military aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Missile, Military, Drone
A Hong Kong-based electronics distributor; according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, part of arms proliferation networks supporting Iran's military, including its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs, led by Emily Liu and Rayan Roshd Afzar.
Military, Drone
A Chinese national; leads an arms proliferation network supporting Iran's military, including its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs.
Missile
An Iran-based electronics company; linked by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen to cruise missile components used by the Houthi rebels.
According to Panel of Experts, was the last entity known to have custody of one of two shipments of German-origin 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitters that were later found in Quds-1 cruise missiles used by the Houthis in attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia; had custody of the shipment in March 2018.
Military, Drone
An Iran-based company; linked by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen to unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components used by the Houthi rebels.
According to the Panel of Experts, was the last entity known to have custody of AM7 ignition coils manufactured by a Sweden-based company that were later found in delta-wing UAVs used by the Houthis in attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.
Established in 2006 or 2009.
Military, Drone
A Chinese businessman who controls Guilin Alpha Rubber and Plastics Technology Co., Ltd; according to the U.S. Treasury Department, has represented Guilin Alpha in the sale of aircraft brake disks to Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries.
Drone
A Hong Kong-based company; has attempted to procure U.S.-origin items in support of Iran's weapons of mass destruction and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Incorporated in Hong Kong in 2013 under the trade name Sunrising Electronics China Limited, which was dissolved in 2017; incorporated in Hong Kong in 2016 under the trade name Sunrising Logistics (HK) Limited, which remains active.
Sanctions
Drone
A Hong Kong-based company; attempted to procure U.S.-origin items in support of Iran's weapons of mass destruction and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Military
An Iranian national who has been a resident of Azerbaijan; according to the U.S. Department of Justice, was involved in a conspiracy to unlawfully export items with military or nuclear applications from the United States to Iran through Canada and the United Arab Emirates.
Nuclear, Military
A company based in the United Arab Emirates; involved in the procurement of components for Iran's nuclear program, according to the European Union.
Missile, Biological, Military, Drone
A Turkish national; involved in procuring equipment for Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and weapons programs on behalf of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Biological, Military, Drone
A Turkey-based company used by Murat Bukey to facilitate business with Iran; involved in procuring equipment for Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and weapons programs on behalf of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Military
A Chinese national who has used deceptive practices to supply Iran with U.S.-origin items that would provide material support to Iran's military industries, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce; director of Chipwinone Electronics.
Military
A Hong Kong- and China-based distributor of electronics; has used deceptive practices to supply Iran with U.S.-origin items that would provide material support to Iran's military industries, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Distributes amplifiers, batteries, capacitors, chokes, coils, crystals, inductors, integrated circuits, isolators, micro-controllers, oscillators, optoelectronics, power supplies, relays, resistors, resonators, sensors, transceivers, transducers, voltage regulators, and materials for circuit protection and semiconductors.
Military, Drone
A China-based company that sells complete unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as autopilot systems and engines for UAVs.
Reportedly sells engines manufactured by Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company (Mado Company), an Iran-based company with links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
A subsea engineering consultancy based in the Republic of Georgia and Hong Kong; according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, part of a network used to supply Iran with U.S.-origin items that would provide material support to Iran's military industries in violation of U.S. export controls.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, other participants in the network include:
Military
A computer, communications, and electronics manufacturer based in China; according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, part of a network used to supply Iran with U.S.-origin items that would provide material support to Iran's military industries in violation of U.S. export controls.
Military
An electronic instrument manufacturer based in Hong Kong; according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, part of a network used to supply Iran with U.S.-origin items that would provide material support to Iran's military industries in violation of U.S. export controls.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, other participants in the network include:
A Russia-based wholesale trading company; has assisted Rostam Qasemi in laundering funds on behalf of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
An Iran-based joint venture between Chinese and Iranian energy companies; has assisted the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with smuggling oil.
A China-based technology research and development company; according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, has procured goods on behalf of Rayan Roshd Afzar Company, a firm that appears on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for providing equipment and services to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard...
Missile
A China-based manufacturer and exporter of metal powder and cemented carbide; determined by the U.S. Department of State to warrant the imposition of sanctions for supporting proliferation-related transfers to or acquisitions by Iran, Syria, or North Korea; has transferred sensitive technology and items to Iran's missile program, according to the U.S. Department of State.
Missile
A China-based exporter of chemicals and related equipment; determined by the U.S. Department of State to warrant the imposition of sanctions for supporting proliferation-related transfers to or acquisitions by Iran, Syria, or North Korea; has transferred sensitive technology and items to Iran's missile program, according to the U.S. Department of State.