Publication Type:
- Articles and Reports
Weapon Program:
- Missile
- Military
The attacks earlier this month on critical oil facilities in Saudi Arabia have sharpened the focus on the ways in which Iran is using its missile capabilities to destabilize the Middle East, including through activities that violate U.N. Security Council resolutions. In a series of coordinated attacks on September 14, some seven cruise missiles and 18 drones allegedly struck the Khurais oilfield and a large oil processing plant at Abqaiq in eastern Saudi Arabia.[1]
Although the Houthis in Yemen have claimed responsibility for these strikes, Iran appears to be responsible. The Saudi government said that missile and drone fragments recovered from the attacks proved that they were "unquestionably sponsored by Iran."[2] A joint statement released on September 23 by the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom reinforced this conclusion, asserting that "Iran bears responsibility for this attack. There is no other plausible explanation."[3] U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has called the attacks an act of war.[4]
This is the latest in a string of incidents orchestrated by Iran in recent months, including attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman in May and June 2019[5] and repeated missile strikes on targets in Saudi Arabia by Houthi militias using Iranian-origin weapon systems. In addition, Iran has attempted to test several space launch vehicles (SLVs) and has launched or displayed an array of ballistic and cruise missiles.
Many of these actions contravene U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, which endorses the nuclear agreement with Iran, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and imposes restrictions on Iranian arms exports and ballistic missile-related activity. Annex B of resolution 2231 requires states to "take the necessary measures to prevent […] the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related material from Iran" and calls on Iran "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology."[6]
A series of U.N. reports by the Secretary-General and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 – the most recent of which were released in June – describe Iran's missile and SLV tests as well as alleged arms transfers to paramilitary groups in the region. The United States has imposed broad sanctions on most sectors of Iran's economy, as well as targeted sanctions on specific entities, in response to these and other destabilizing actions. Yet little has been done internationally in response to Iran's actions, largely due to disagreement among Security Council members.
The failure to act is particularly troubling given that these arms and missiles restrictions will soon terminate, in 2020 and 2023, respectively. The problem will only compound when they expire.
Ongoing Arms Exports
Iran has continued to export missiles and other arms to paramilitary groups in the Middle East in violation of resolution 2231 as well as U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, which imposes an arms embargo against Houthi leaders and their militias. [7]
The most recent U.N. reports related to the implementation of resolution 2231 indicate that a consignment of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components seized by Saudi Arabia en route to the Houthis in March 2018 appears to be of Iranian origin.[8] This consignment included surface-to-air missiles with features "consistent with those of the Iranian Sayyad-2C," according to one report.[9] One missile, which was examined by U.N. investigators in Washington D.C., featured markings in Farsi on the airframe and internal components. The dimensions and markings of this missile are "consistent with" another missile examined by U.N. investigators in Riyadh, and both missiles have serial numbers that indicate they come from the same production lot.
Several unmanned aerial vehicles recovered in Yemen also appear to be of Iranian origin. Remnants of one extended-range UAV – seized in Yemen by the United Arab Emirates and examined by U.N. investigators in September 2018 – carried a "Model V10" vertical gyroscope similar to the "Model V9" version found on an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle recovered in Afghanistan in 2016.[10] Additionally, the Secretariat examined components of an unmanned surface vessel packed with explosives that was recovered off the coast of Yemen in September 2016 and determined that certain components were of Iranian manufacture.[11]
The U.N. reports also highlight ongoing Iranian military support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel has alleged that Iranian assistance to Hezbollah includes a "precision-guided missile conversion programme" and "the proliferation of mass weapons manufacturing capabilities."[12] Israel also cited an increase in transfers from Tehran to the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut in recent months and accused Iran of providing Hezbollah with "technical training and assistance to manufacture, maintain and use these weapons."[13] Recent speeches by the leaders of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group describe technical missile support that likewise suggests Iranian involvement.[14] Additionally, Israel reported that in January 2019 the IRGC-Quds Force launched a surface-to-surface missile from Syria toward the Golan Heights.[15]
The U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen has also cited repeated Iranian violations of resolution 2216.[16] Its 2017 report found Iran in "non-compliance" with the agreement for repeated transfers of military equipment to the Houthis.[17] The Panel's most recent report, released in January 2019, noted that recently examined components of Houthi cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles were of Iranian manufacture.[18]
Missile Launches
The latest U.N. reports review Iranian ballistic missile activity since December 2018 that is inconsistent with resolution 2231. The qualifying part of the ballistic missile language in the resolution prohibits Iran from developing and testing missiles "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons." This allows Iran and its supporters on the Security Council to argue that Iran's missiles are not specifically designed for nuclear missions and therefore do not violate the resolution.
On December 1, Iran fired a medium-range ballistic missile – reportedly a Khorramshahr – which France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States determined to be "inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons."[19] The Khorramshahr is a category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km and as such is considered nuclear-capable.[20] Israel also accused Iran of flight testing a series of ballistic missiles in addition to the Khorramshahr between December 2018 and February 2019, including a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, as well as a Qiam, a Scud, and three Zolfaghar short-range ballistic missiles.[21] According to U.S. officials, Iran once again tested a Shabab-3 in July.[22]
Recent developments in Iran’s space program have been even more controversial. Iran launched two SLVs at the beginning of the year, on January 15 and February 6. The January launch showcased the Simorgh rocket, which was first tested in 2016, while the February launch featured the Safir.[23] Both rockets have a diameter of at least 1.25 m, large enough to accommodate a nuclear warhead.[24] Although both tests failed, they likely provided valuable test data for Iranian engineers that could also support the development of longer range ballistic missiles. In a statement to the United Nations, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom reported that SLV technologies are similar to those used in ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3 and the Khorramshahr, while the United States asserted that the launches involved "technologies related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons."[25] As with ballistic missile tests, however, Iran and its supporters on the Security Council defended the space launches, asserting that resolution 2231 does not mention SLVs.[26] More recently, in late August, satellite images released by the U.S. government revealed smoke rising from a launch pad at Iran's Semnan Space Center, indicating another attempted launch.[27]
While the United Nations has failed to move beyond verbal condemnation, the United States has continued to increase pressure on Iran's missile and space programs, including through targeted sanctions. On August 28, the Treasury Department blacklisted two networks supporting Iran's missile program that include entities operating in China, Hong Kong, and Iran.[28] In September, the United States also imposed sanctions on the Iranian Space Agency and two of its research institutes, calling space launch vehicle technologies "virtually identical and interchangeable with those used in ballistic missiles," including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).[29]
"Time is Running Out"
Without an international consensus, Iranian missile tests and arms transfers will likely continue, further escalating tension in the region. This escalatory pattern comes as the expiry dates for arms and missile restrictions in resolution 2231 approach, in 2020 and 2023, respectively. In an effort to rally an international response, the State Department launched a countdown to the expiration of some of these restrictions on October 18, 2020, warning that "time is running out on international agreements restraining the Iranian regime."[30] The recent attacks on Saudi oil facilities and international shipping, as well as repeated instances of Iranian arms recovered in Yemen, illustrate the pressing need for an international response.
Footnotes:
[1] Saudis Say Weapons Debris Proves Iran Behind Oil Attack, U.S. Denounces 'Act Of War'," Radio Free Europe, September 18, 2019, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/saudi-arabia-says-drones-missiles-used-in-oil-attack-sponsored-by-iran-/30171635.html, accessed on September 23, 2019.
[2] Ibid.
[3] "Joint statement by the heads of state and government of France, Germany and the United Kingdom," U.K. Prime Minister's Office, September 23, 2019, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom, accessed on September 24, 2019.
[4] Saudis Say Weapons Debris Proves Iran Behind Oil Attack, U.S. Denounces 'Act Of War'," Radio Free Europe, September 18, 2019, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/saudi-arabia-says-drones-missiles-used-in-oil-attack-sponsored-by-iran-/30171635.html, accessed on September 23, 2019.
[5] Lisa Barrington and Lesley Wroughton, "U.S. blames Iran for tanker attacks in Gulf of Oman, Iran rejects assertion," Reuters, June 13, 2019, available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-tanker-idUKKCN1TE0ME, accessed on September 23, 2019.
[6] “Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, July 20, 2015, pp. 99, 101, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/res2231e.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[7] “Resolution 2216 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, April 14, 2015, available at https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2216%20(2015), accessed on August 23, 2019.
[8] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019; “Seventh six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 21, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/letter.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[15] “Seventh six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 21, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/letter.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[16] “Resolution 2216 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, April 14, 2015, available at https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2216%20(2015), accessed on August 23, 2019.
[17] "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen," United Nations Security Council, January 26, 2018, available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_83.pdf, accessed on September 16, 2019.
[18] "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen," United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2019, pp. 28, 87, 145, available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_83.pdf, accessed on September 16, 2019.
[19] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019; Jeremy Binnie, “Israel says Iran continues ballistic missile launches,” Jane’s 360, June 5, 2019, available at https://www.janes.com/article/89058/israel-says-iran-continues-ballistic-missile-launches, accessed on August 26, 2019.
[20] “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, July 2017, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr, accessed on August 23, 2019; “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” Missile Technology Control Regime, available at https://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[21] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019; “Seventh six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 21, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/letter.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[22] Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, "In Escalation, Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile, U.S. Official Says," The New York Times, July 25, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/iran-missile-test.html, accessed on September 23, 2019.
[23] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019; William Graham, “Iran improving its rockets ten years after its first satellite launch,” February 2, 2019, available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/images-suggest-iran-launched-satellite-despite-us-criticism/, accessed on August 26, 2019.
[24] "Safir," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2018, available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/safir/, accessed on September 25, 2019; "Simorgh," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2018, available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/simorgh/, accessed on September 25, 2019.
[25] “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations Security Council, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/report.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2019.
[26] Ibid.
[27] "Iranian Rocket Launch Ends In Failure, Imagery Shows," NPR, August 29, 2019, available at https://www.npr.org/2019/08/29/755406765/iranian-rocket-launch-ends-in-failure-images-show, accessed on September 16, 2019.
[28] "Treasury Targets Procurement Networks Supporting Iran’s Missile Proliferation Programs," U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 28, 2019, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm759, accessed on September 16, 2019.
[29] "New Sanctions Designations on Iran’s Space Program," U.S. Department of States, September 3, 2019, available at https://www.state.gov/new-sanctions-designations-on-irans-space-program/, accessed on September 16, 2019.
[30] "Time on Iran's Restrictions Is Running Out," U.S. Department of State, available at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/iran/, accessed on August 30, 2019.