In this episode of Iran Watch Listen, Wisconsin Project Executive Director Valerie Lincy and Senior Research Associate John Caves sat down with John Lauder, a Wisconsin Project Senior Fellow with more than three decades of experience in the U.S. intelligence community, to think through the new realities after the bombing of Iran’s nuclear program and the return of U.N. sanctions. What might come next? The conversation took place on September 18.

Background

Israeli and U.S. airstrikes in June set back Iran’s nuclear program, and in August, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the “E3”) initiated the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism to restore a decade’s worth of United Nations sanctions on Iran. These actions have changed the game when it comes to Tehran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, but they also created new uncertainties. What and how much of Iran’s nuclear program survived the strikes—measured in facilities, equipment, enriched uranium, and technical knowledge—is only partly known, as is how U.N. member states will react to renewed sanctions.

A sizable amount of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile seems to remain intact and Iran may have centrifuges in storage, or be able to salvage centrifuges from bombed sites, which could enable it to resume uranium enrichment. However, any decision to do so would be seriously constrained by the loss of key facilities and personnel, and the difficulty of accessing material and equipment from damaged sites. Resuming enrichment would also be fraught with risk due to Iran’s intelligence penetration by foreign adversaries and lack of effective air defenses and conventional deterrents. Russia and China, meanwhile, have stated that they will not accept the renewal of U.N. sanctions through snapback as legitimate, setting up a diplomatic tug-of-war over sanctions enforcement.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom discuss the Iranian nuclear issue with the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Policy. (Photo Credit: French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs)

Our Discussion

We began our discussion by summarizing our new “timetable” on Iran Watch that estimates how long it might take Iran to make fuel for a small nuclear weapon arsenal under various scenarios that take into account the damage caused by the airstrikes. John Caves explained the assumptions that underpin those estimates, including the possibility that Iran could salvage or have stored away some gas centrifuges produced before the strikes. John Lauder and Valerie discussed how the absence of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors since the strikes places an increased burden on national intelligence agencies to monitor the possible resumption of Iran’s nuclear program at both known and secret sites.

We then considered several factors that might constrain Iran’s ability to pursue a bomb or deter it from making that choice altogether. One of those factors is the loss of experienced nuclear scientists, which John Lauder argued would set back Iran’s nuclear program to some extent, but likely not permanently. John Lauder also remarked on how well Israeli and other intelligence organizations had seemingly penetrated the Iranian program, but cautioned that it would likely take time to re-establish intelligence sources and methods following the strikes. John Caves and John Lauder then discussed Iran’s conventional vulnerability and the obstacles it faces in rebuilding its air defenses and missile arsenal.

The topic then turned to the imminent reimposition, or “snapback,” of U.N. sanctions. John Caves summarized the restrictions that would come back into effect, and Valerie explained the rationale for triggering the snapback mechanism. The group then discussed Russia’s and China’s efforts to undermine the legitimacy of snapback and the importance of convincing other countries to support the sanctions’ implementation.

Finally, the group discussed Iran’s relationship with Russia and China and how Tehran fits into the emerging “Axis of Upheaval”. John Lauder observed that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea each have their own expectations for the relationship, and that Iran as the comparatively weaker power might be disappointed in what it receives from it. Valerie agreed and contended that Moscow and Beijing do not want Tehran to completely fail but may not want it to be too militarily successful, either, lest that cause instability in the world economy. John Caves cited a counterpoint that Iran might not be able to count on direct Russian or Chinese support in a crisis, but that their cooperation in the background between crises might continue to increase.

Related Resources

• John Caves, Valerie Lincy, and Gary Milhollin, “Hidden Among the Rubble: Iran’s Post-Strike Weapon Potential,” Iran Watch, August 26, 2025.
• “Table of Iranian Nuclear Sites and Related Facilities,” Iran Watch, July 24, 2025.
• Valerie Lincy, “Nuclear Strikes on Iran: What We Don’t Know,” Iran Watch, June 24, 2025.
• “Iran Watch Special Newsletter: Israel Strikes Iranian Nuclear Sites,” Iran Watch, June 13, 2025.
• John Caves, John Krzyzaniak, Valerie Lincy, “Trigger Warning: The Consequences of Snapping Back Sanctions on Iran,” Iran Watch, January 31, 2023.
• Austin Bodetti and John Caves, “Stuck in the Past: The U.N.’s 2231 List,” Iran Watch, January 31, 2022.
• Leon Aron, “The Iran-China-Russia Axis Crumbles When It Matters,” The Atlantic, June 29, 2025.
• Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Big Mistake the West Is Making About Russia, China, and Iran,” National Security Journal, July 30, 2025.

Credits

Intro/Outro music by AudioCoffee (Denys Kyshchuk): https://www.audiocoffee.net.

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