Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG)

Also Known As: 

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Hemmat Missile Industries Factory
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories
Shahid Hemmat Industries Group
Shahid Hemmat Complex
Shahid Hemmat Industries
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex
Shahid Hemat Industrial Complex
Shahid Hemmat

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile


Damavand Road 2, Abali Road, Tehran
Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
Tehran, Tehran, Damavand Road, Azmayesh Trisection, Above Mechanical Industries, Facing Valfajr Boulevard (Hakimiyeh), Iran


Tel.: 021-73206121, 021-77302090, 77307901-021, 73206121

A subordinate of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) responsible for Iran's liquid-fuelled ballistic missile program, including the medium-range Shahab-3 (based on North Korea's No Dong missile).

Reportedly imported fuel and materials for the construction of medium-range missiles; reportedly contracted with Russia's Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) in 1996 for the construction of a wind tunnel for missile design, the manufacture of model missiles, and the development of related computer software; reportedly negotiated with Russia's Inor to procure materials used in building missiles, including high-technology laser equipment, special mirrors, maraging steel, and tungsten-coated graphite material.

Reportedly involved in the transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex Category I item(s) with North Korea; reportedly involved in the procurement of ballistic missile technology from China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).

Entities reported to have been involved in procurement for SHIG include:

Front companies that have acted on SHIG's behalf include:

Subordinate entities include:

Entities reported to have provided financial services for SHIG include Bank Melli and Bank Sepah.

Equipment reportedly includes a five-ton crane and instruments for sound, humidity, temperature, pressure, electrical, and dimensional measurements; has conducted research on weight optimization of the structure of a three-stage liquid fuel rocket, weight optimization of cylindrical shells, the physical-mechanical properties of a hard chrome coating, and the design of a ballistic missile autopilot.

Reportedly signed a contract for research cooperation on ballistic systems, satellites, and liquid fuel with Khaje Nasir University (K.N. Toosi University of Technology); general manager of the calibration center is reportedly Said Hassan Alavi; former head is reportedly Ali Mahmoudi Mimand; as of March 2007, headed by Naser Maleki, a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 missile.


Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 23, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Designated by the U.S. Department of State on June 28, 2005, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; added on June 28, 2005, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Added on July 12, 2007, to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List of end users subject to heightened export license requirements (with a presumption of denial) due to involvement in proliferation activities or other activities of national security concern.

Sanctioned for a period of two years by the United States on May 9, 2003, and September 26, 2007, pursuant to Executive Order 12938, for engaging in proliferation activities; sanctions prohibit U.S. government procurement from or assistance to the entity, import into the United States of products provided by the entity, and transfers of U.S.-origin defense goods and services destined for the entity.

Sanctioned (with all successors and sub-units) by the U.S. Department of State on April 6, 2000, and November 17, 2000, for missile technology proliferation activities; sanctions apply for two years and prohibit the issuance of export licenses and U.S. government contracts to the entity and the importation into the United States of products produced by the entity.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.

Date Entered: 

January 26, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

December 20, 2023