In December, a federal court charged two men with conspiring to export U.S.-origin electronics to an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The defendants had duped an American company into exporting electronics and technical data through Switzerland to Iran, with lethal consequences.

An Iranian procurement agent and his Chinese accomplice worked together to funnel electronic components to the IRGC's drone program. Then, they each went on to build supply rings of their own. A Wisconsin Project investigation sheds light on the tactics they used and how their respective networks evolved over time.

In January, U.S. forces conducted two operations to stop vessels smuggling lethal aid from Iran to Yemen. The interdictions took place against a backdrop of ongoing Houthi missile and drone attacks against ships in the Red Sea, highlighting the role Iran has played in enabling the Houthis' assault on global commerce.

Rumor has it that the notorious proliferator Karl Lee may be in prison, but open-source evidence suggests that his network is still active.

In early 2022, a British Royal Navy ship intercepted small boats carrying weaponry in international waters south of Iran. The evidence strongly suggests that the weapons came from Iran, but a deeper investigation also points to companies based in several other countries that enabled Iran to acquire the components in the first place.

From 2017 to 2018, an Iranian procurement network attempted to export sensitive counter-drone technology from the United States to Iran. Iranian national Jalal Rohollahnejad directed the scheme from Iran while working for Rayan Roshd Afzar (Rayan Roshd), an aerospace firm linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He recruited Saber Fakih, the CEO of a telecommunications company in the United Kingdom, to help facilitate procurement. Using the British company as a front, the conspirators facilitated the payment of almost half a million dollars from Rayan Roshd to an unwitting U.S. company and prepared another deal valued at almost $1 million with a second U.S. company. While neither deal resulted in a successful export, Rohollahnejad continues to operate from Iran today.

As Iran ramps up uranium enrichment, authorities in multiple countries have uncovered efforts by Iranian agents to procure mass spectrometers from abroad. These dual-use machines, which can precisely measure the purity and molecular structure of radioactive material, are essential for uranium enrichment. They also have a range of non-nuclear uses.

On May 8, the U.S. Navy released a statement describing the seizure of “an illicit shipment of weapons” in the northern Arabian Sea that had taken place over the previous two days.